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We develop a new-Keynesian DSGE model with an extended fiscal policy 
block to assess the conditions for expansionary fiscal consolidations. In 
addition to several taxes, we consider public employment expenditures and 
government spending, which may have different degrees of productivity. 
We calibrate the model for the Euro Area and use it to simulate alternative 
fiscal consolidations with changes in the budget composition. Among the 
main conclusions we find that: (i) if conducted with a cut in weakly-
productive spending and a symmetric increase in highly-productive 
spending, fiscal consolidations have expansionary effects on investment and 
output; (ii) if consolidation is pursued through a pure reduction in weakly-
productive public employment, the effects on output decrease with the 
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After the ﬁscal proﬂigacy of the 1970s and early 1980s, several OECD governments
undertook large ﬁscal consolidations, aiming at sustainably reducing public deﬁcits and
debt. Despite those eﬀorts, further substantial ﬁscal adjustments cannot be avoided
in most OECD countries in coming decades. In particular, the high levels of budget
deﬁcits and/or public debts, that resulted from the widespread ﬁscal stimulus against
the 2007/08 ﬁnancial crisis and the ensuing global depression, combined with the re-
quirements of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are currently requiring the consol-
idation of public ﬁnances in some European countries. Such need is further reinforced
by the medium- and long-term spending pressures on public ﬁnances, related, inter alia,
to population ageing.
Fiscal consolidations are usually expected to imply short-term contractionary eﬀects
on output, given the Keynesian positive ﬁscal spending multiplier. However, there is
a long standing debate about the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, with yet no
consensus on its impact on short-term output growth.1
At a theoretical level, the traditional Keynesian view of a larger than one ﬁscal
multiplier, which was the conventional wisdom both in academic and in policy-making
circles until then, has been challenged in the second half of the 1970s. On the one hand,
new classical business cycle models, with wage and price ﬂexibility and continuous
market clearing, predict that ﬁscal policy can aﬀect output only temporarily and if
economic agents do not anticipate it. On the other hand, new Keynesian models, with
intertemporal optimization and rational expectations, market imperfections and wage
and price stickiness, raised the possibility of smaller or even negative ﬁscal multipliers
(Cogan et al. (2010), Cwik and Wieland (2011)).
At a policy level, following the expansion of the modern welfare state during the 30
golden years, the usefulness of ﬁscal policy for stabilization has been challenged by the
environment of high inﬂation and unemployment as budget deﬁcits rose and there was
a rapid accumulation of public debt. For the ﬁr s tt i m ei nd e c a d e st h e r ew a sac o n ﬂict
between cyclical stabilization and the long-term sustainability of public ﬁnances.
A tt h ee m p i r i c a ll e v e l ,t h ee x t e n s i v ew o r ko nt h eo u t p u te ﬀects of ﬁscal consolida-
tions since the early 1990s has failed to provide robust stylized facts on their short-run
output eﬀects. The literature may be summarized in three main groups, namely stud-
1For detailed surveys of the literature see, for example, European Commission (2003), Briotti (2005)
and Hebous (2011).
1ies comparing tax and spending multipliers, analyses of the transmission mechanism of
ﬁscal policy, and studies of the dimension of the ﬁscal multiplier.
Regarding spending versus tax multipliers, the literature has typically estimated tax
revenue multipliers relatively large and persistent, but smaller spending multipliers,
lower than one on impact and decreasing thereafter (Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Alesina and Ardagna (2010)). More recently, Perotti
(2005), Favero and Giavazzi (2007), Bilbiie et al. (2008) have found that the size of
spending multipliers has fallen gradually after the 1980s.
Regarding the transmission of ﬁscal policy, while the results on the relation between
ﬁscal policy and private consumption seem uncertain, although predominantly Keyne-
sian (Perotti (1999), Giavazzi et al. (2000), Hogan (2004)), the evidence points to a large
and persistent positive reaction of private investment to successful ﬁscal consolidations,
which does not seem possible to justify only by simple textbook crowding-in eﬀects
(Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside et al. (2004), Mountford and Uhlig (2009)).
R e g a r d i n gt h es i z eo ft h eﬁscal multiplier, the evidence suggests that it is related to
a set of critical conditions, namely the size and persistence of the ﬁscal consolidation,
the initial state of public ﬁnances and, most especially, its composition in terms of
ﬁscal instruments. With this respect, it is generally found that consolidations based
on spending cuts lead to small or even negative ﬁscal multipliers (the so-called non-
Keynesian eﬀects), due to increases in private investment, especially in the case of cuts
in government wage bills and welfare payments (Alesina and Ardagna (2010)). As they
directly aﬀect the labor market, spending cuts induce market adjustments that reduce
unit labor costs, increase proﬁts and increase investment growth, with the structure
and institutions of the labor market playing an important role in these eﬀects (Alesina
and Perotti (1995), Alesina et al. (2002)).
Against this background, this paper asks whether it is possible to conduct ﬁscal con-
solidations without relatively high short-term output losses, or even, as some empirical
evidence suggests, with some short-term output expansion. The paper contributes to
the debate by developing a new-Keynesian DSGE model with a ﬁscal policy block that
allows for alternative budget compositions, which is used for a thorough assessment of
the investment and output eﬀects of alternative ﬁscal consolidation strategies.
The paper is closely related to a recent generation of new-Keynesian general equi-
librium models that include a more developed ﬁscal policy block (Coenen and Straub
(2005), Galí et al. (2007), Coenen et al. (2008)). Following modern sticky-prices new
Keynesian DSGE models, as ﬁrstly suggested by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Chris-
2tiano et al. (2005), we develop a medium-scale general equilibrium model, with a thor-
ough set of ﬁscal budget components. In particular, we introduce government spending
and public employment expenditures as variables with a direct relation with total pri-
vate factor productivity in the intermediate goods sector. Government spending is split
into highly-productive, weakly- and non-productive spending and public employment
expenditure into a strong and a weak productivity component. The productivities of
each class of expenditure are calibrated in line with the evidence in related empirical
literature.
Motivated by a growing consensus that the success of a ﬁscal consolidation depends
on the "quality" of ﬁscal adjustments, i.e. on shifts in the budget decreasing less pro-
ductive forms of expenditure (Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008)), we simulate several
experiments of ﬁscal consolidations with alternative changes in the budget composition.
Our main results may be summarized as follows: (i) The success — dimension and
sustainability — of ﬁscal consolidations, either via public spending reductions or em-
ployment costs reduction, decreases with their degree of productivity; (ii) Consolida-
tions through contractions of weakly-productive or, alternatively, non-productive public
spending, generate short-run contractions of output; however, output falls twice as much
in the case of weakly-productive spending consolidations, as investment falls, in con-
trast to what happens in the case of unproductive spending consolidations; (iii) If the
consolidation is conducted with a structural change in the ﬁscal budget in favor of more
productive spending — a cut in weakly- (or non-) productive spending together with a
symmetric increase in highly-productive spending — the model predicts a positive short-
run impact on output; there is a positive impact on output as long as highly-productive
spending increases by 70 percent of the reduction in the weakly-productive spending
(or 40 percent of the cut in non-productive spending); (iv) Consolidation through a re-
duction in weakly-productive public employment yields results that are similar to those
of a reduction in weakly-productive public spending; however the negative eﬀects on
output decrease with the degree of labor market competition and can even turn out to
be positive in a perfect competition scenario; (v) The less productive is the public ex-
p e n d i t u r et h a ti sc u t ,a n dt h em o r ec o m p e t i t i v et h el a b o rm a r k e ti s ,t h em o r ef a v o r a b l e
is the reaction of private investment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the composition and pro-
ductivity of public expenditures, including the review of the estimates that are used to
calibrate our model. Section 3 develops our new-Keynesian DSGE model. Section 4,
ﬁr s t l y ,a n a l y z e st h ei m p a c to nd e b to fs h o c k st oe a c ho ft h ed i ﬀerent ﬁscal spending
3components, in order to verify which may lead to a sizable and sustained ﬁscal consoli-
dation; then, it presents and discusses the general equilibrium eﬀects of the ﬁscal shocks
that have been identiﬁed as achieving a ﬁscal consolidation. Section 5 concludes.
2 Composition of Public Expenditure and Macroe-
conomic Productivity
The main distinctive feature of our analysis of ﬁscal consolidations is considering changes
to the budget composition that impact on overall productivity, in a general equilibrium
framework. To motivate our approach, in this section we brieﬂy review the literature
on the productivity of public expenditure.2
Much of the literature focusing on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy considers government
spending as consisting entirely of unproductive expenditure on goods, overlooking the
productive and employment components of public spending. However, "In practice,
government expenditure is on a variety of goods, some of which are intended to enhance
the productive capacity in the economy" (Turnovsky (2000), p.255)
Macroeconomists have known for a long time that public spending is an important
input in the production of total output, but only recently has this feature of public
spending been explicitly modeled. To the best of our knowledge, Ratner (1983) has
been the ﬁrst to suggest an empirical model explicitly adding public spending to the
neoclassical production function and to present econometric evidence consistent with
that hypothesis. Barro (1990) has introduced government expenditure as an argument
in the production function of a theoretical endogenous growth model.
This strand of literature received an important impulse with Aschauer’s (1989a,
1989b, 1990) empirical assessment of the eﬀects of public inputs on output and pro-
ductivity. Testing the hypothesis that the decrease in productive government services
had been crucial for the productivity slowdown of the early 1970s in the United States,
Aschauer (1989a) used a production function approach and found a strong positive
relation between the stock of non-military public structures and equipment and total
output, estimating an elasticity of 0.39 for 1949-1985. Such a ﬁgure has been considered
surprisingly high by several authors, as it implies that public inputs seem more pro-
2For comprehensive surveys on this empirical literature see, among others, Gramlich (1994), Romp
and de Haan (2007) and Pereira and Andraz (2010).
4ductive than private capital. Aschauer’s controversial results stimulated a large body
of empirical research testing their robustness, which has yielded mixed results.
The criticism to Aschauer’s analysis has focused essentially on possible econometric
problems such as non-stationarities, omitted variables and reverse causation.3 Subse-
quently, alternative approaches based on the estimation of cost and proﬁt functions
and on VAR models were not able to settle the issue, with some supporting Aschauer’s
hypothesis, but others concluding against it.
Overall, it can be argued that public inputs are relevant in the production process
− either by directly providing intermediate services to private sector ﬁrms, or by com-
plementing private inputs in production − and thus raise the marginal productivity of
private capital and labor. The controversy lays on the magnitude of the contribution.
The literature suggests that diﬀerent types of public expenditure have diﬀerent
impacts on the private factors productivity. Public capital stock, and especially non-
military "core" infrastructures (highways, airports, electric and gas facilities, water
systems, sewers, mass transit), directly raise the productive capacity of private ﬁrms,
and are the most productive government expenditures. In fact, at a national level
(either for the US or for some European countries), several studies found elasticities
in line with Aschauer’s (1989a); for example, Fernald (1999), Everaert and Heylen
(2004) and Abdih and Joutz (2008), estimated an output elasticity of, respectively,
0.35, 0.31 and 0.39. However, other studies found smaller output elasticities, in the
range 0.15−0.25, as for example, Finn (1993), Kamps (2005) and Heintz (2010) (0.16,
0.22 and 0.21, respectively).
Recently, using a meta-analysis of all relevant studies until 2005, Ligthart and Suárez
(2011) concluded that for national level studies the weighted average estimate of the
impact of public capital on total factor productivity is an elasticity of 0.20 (with a
conﬁdence interval that goes from a lower bound of 0.177 to a upper bound of 0.224).
Other types of government spending, generally seen as comprising less productive
capital expenditures (for instance, public buildings and football stadiums) or a set of
non capital expenditures (including, among others, basic education, health care, enter-
tainment, culture, national defense and environment) provide a lower contribution to
private production. While Aschauer’s estimates for these elasticities are insigniﬁcant,
Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1992) and Evans and Karras (1994) found a positive corre-
3When output growth is high, incomes are rising rapidly and then the government can provide more
public goods and services; i.e., the correlation can reﬂect a demand-side rather then a supply-side causal
relationship.
5lation between these types of government spending, especially in education, and total
output, estimating an elasticity in the range of 0.04 to 0.16, and Cutanda and Parício
(1992) found an output elasticity of 0.11 with respect to social capital.
The main conclusion of this section is that governments should be able to achieve
productivity gains by altering the composition of government spending from weakly-
to highly-productive expenses. Then, a criterious selection of the type of public expen-
diture cut in ﬁscal consolidations may minimize the possible negative output impact
of these cuts and may even generate a positive impact, as ﬁscal consolidation could
be reconciled with an increase in global productivity. In the next sections we assess
this conjecture. Our analysis will be based on model simulations developed within a
new-Keynesian DSGE model overall calibrated for the Euro Area.
3 The Model
Sticky-prices new-Keynesian DSGE models developed along the lines of Smets and
Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005) are presently the most-favoured framework
for policy analysis. In spite of their extensive use for monetary policy analysis, new-
Keynesian DSGE models have been far less used for ﬁscal policy analysis, which explains
the typical extreme simplicity of their ﬁscal policy block. We develop a version of the
state-of-the art new-Keynesian DSGE model that features a further detailed ﬁscal policy
block.
The structure of the model (agents, preferences, sources of inertia and market struc-
tures) is essentially similar to Smets and Wouters (2003). There are mainly two dif-
ferences. First, we consider, in addition to the standard monopolistic competition
structure, a perfectly competitive labor market (Galí et al. (2007)), for the sake of
comparison. Second, our ﬁscal policy block is particularly developed.
The government purchases ﬁnal goods from the private sector and ﬁnances its spend-
ing requirements with lump-sum taxes and with three diﬀerent types of distortionary
taxes, over consumption, labor income and capital income. As usual, a ﬁscal rule
guarantees that the debt dynamics is non-explosive.
Public spending comprises three types of productive public expenditures: (i) highly-
productive spending; (ii) weakly-productive spending; and (iii) public employment.
Expenditures of type (i) should be thought of as those associated with public capital;
expenditures of type (ii) broadly correspond to items of current public spending that
6may also somewhat increase private factors productivity, like basic education, security
and justice, and basic health care.
The introduction of government spending in the production function of the private
sector follows the seminal work by Aschauer (1989a). The implied productivity eﬀect
of public spending on private factors has also been outlined by Finn (1998), among
others, and is one channel through which the government can inﬂuence the economic
activity.
The literature is very scarce as regards the inclusion of government expenditures
in the production function within new-Keynesian DSGE models.4 To the best of our
knowledge, the only exception is Pappa (2009) who has incorporated both productive
government spending and public employment in a new-Keynesian DSGE model. Yet,
our exercise diﬀers from hers in several respects: ﬁrst, our model is more complete in
what regards nominal and real frictions and is thus more likely to be data-consistent;
second, we do not limit productive public spending to correspond to public investment;
ﬁnally, we aim at studying the eﬀects and transmission mechanisms of ﬁscal consolida-
tions.
3.1 Households
Households maximize an intertemporal utility function, separable in consumption (C)
















where the index θ represents a continuum of households that diﬀer in that they supply a
diﬀerentiated type of labor, β is the discount factor and Uθ























Utility depends negatively on labor supply, lθ
t, and positively on consumption, Cθ
t ,
relative to a time-varying external habit variable, Ht,t h a ti sa s s u m e dt ob ep r o p o r t i o n a l
to aggregate past consumption (habit formation in consumption):
4Finn (1998) and Cavallo (2005) explicitly incorporate productive public spending and public em-
ployment but in a purely neoclassical DSGE model.
7Ht = hCt−1. (3)
In equation (2) the parameters σc and σN represent, respectively, the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion of households or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and the inverse of the elasticity of work eﬀo r tw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h er e a l
wage. εb
t and εN
t are two preference shocks that aﬀect the intertemporal substitution of
households and the labor supply, which are assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive






























This constraint means that current real disposable income, Y θ
t ,a n dr e a lﬁnancial
wealth, which is hold in the form of government bonds Bθ
t, can be used for consumption,
Cθ
t , (including consumption taxes τc
t), and investment in physical capital, Iθ
t .G o v e r n -
ment bonds are one-period securities with price bt,a n dbtBθ
t+1 is the current value of
future holdings of government bonds5.
Current disposable income, Y θ
t , consists of the sum of labor income with the return
on the real capital stock and the dividends paid by the imperfect competitive interme-
diate ﬁrms, Divθ
t, deducted from the lump-sum taxes, Tθ
t and distortionary labor and



























t is the real wage, rk
t the real rental price of capital services and δ is the
depreciation rate.
Consumption and savings behavior
Households maximize their objective function, given by equations (1) and (2), sub-
5As bt = 1


























































































where Rt =1 /bt is the gross nominal rate of return on bonds and λt is the marginal
utility of consumption.















⎦ =1 . (12)
Investment and capital accumulation
Households own the capital stock which they rent out to ﬁrms at a given rental
rate of rk
t. They decide how much capital to accumulate in each period given the
depreciation rate (δ)a n dt h ec o s t s( S(·)) of adjusting the capital stock, which are a
positive function of changes in investment,6










t represents a shock to the investment cost function, which is assumed to
follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error term:
6It is assumed that, in the steady-state, S (·) equals zero, and the ﬁrst derivative, S0 (·),a l s oe q u a l s








Households choose the capital stock and investment in order to maximize their
intertemporal objective function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, as
described by (8) and (9), as well as subject to the capital accumulation equation (13).
The resulting ﬁrst-order conditions are the following equations for the real current






















































Labor supply and wage setting
Each household provides diﬀerentiated labor inputs, and wages are set according
to the Calvo model: households are allowed to optimally adjust their wage to e wθ
t each
period with a constant probability equal to 1−ξw (Calvo (1983)). The fraction of wages











where γw is the degree of wage indexation. When γw =0there is no indexation, and
the wages that cannot be reoptimized remain constant; when γw =1there is perfect
indexation to past inﬂation.
Households set nominal wages to maximize their intertemporal objective function
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, as described by (8) and (9), as well as










where λw,t is a stochastic parameter that determines the time-varying wage markup. It
is assumed that λw,t = λw+ηw
t ,w i t hηw
t i.i.d.-normal. The aggregate labor demand, Nt,
























































t+i are, respectively, the marginal utility of consumption and the
marginal disutility of labor.
Following the Calvo model, and given equat i o n s( 1 7 )a n d( 2 0 ) ,t h el a wo fm o t i o no f









+( 1− ξw)(e wt)
−1/λw,t. (22)
Perfectly competitive labor market
As seen in section 1, some literature on the short-term eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations
suggests that under increased labor market eﬃciency and competitiveness, consolida-
tions may generate a surge in private investment, that can lead to small or even negative
ﬁscal multipliers. Motivated by this evidence, and given the purposes of our analysis,
we will conduct our simulations not only under the standard monopolistic competition
but also under a perfectly competitive labor market.
Each household chooses the quantity of hours supplied given the market wage, i.e.
maximizes, with respect to labor supply, the intertemporal objective function (8) sub-
ject to the intertemporal budget constraint (9). The ﬁrst-order condition is the following
equation for the real wage:
λt(1 − τ
n



















There is a single ﬁnal good, used for consumption and investment, and a continuum of
intermediate goods indexed by j,w i t hj distributed over the unit interval [0,1].T h e
ﬁnal-good sector is perfectly competitive while there is monopolistic competition in the
markets for intermediate goods.
Final-good sector
The ﬁnal good is assumed to be produced using the intermediate goods with the














t denotes quantity of intermediate good of type j a td a t eta n dε is the constant
elasticity of substitution.













where Pt is the overall price index of the ﬁnal good and p
j
t are the prices of the
intermediate inputs. From (25) and (26), the demand for each intermediate input and















































The production function (29) features constant returns to scale with respect to
private inputs.7 It diﬀers from the standard production function in that public spending
has three components, Glp, Ghp and Ng, respectively, low productivity (or unproductive)
spending, high productivity spending and public employment. The three types of public
expenditures are incorporated in the production function as a part of the technologic
constraint that enhances the productivity of private factors. We assume that these
p u b l i ci n p u t sa r ef r e e l ym a d ea v a i l a b l eb yt h eg o v e r n m e n ta tt h eb e g i n n i n go fe a c h
period.
The output elasticities of each of the components of public spending, γ, η and ν,
determine the interaction between public and private inputs in production. Depending
on their value, an increase in government spending or employment has large, small or
null eﬀects on output.
εa
t is a productivity shock, assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process








Labor demand by private ﬁr m si sd e r i v e df r o mt h eﬁrms’ cost minimization for a
















which implies that the capital-labor ratio will be identical across all intermediate
good producers and equal to the aggregate capital-labor ratio.


























7In the empirical literature there is no clear preference between constant returns to scale in all
inputs or only in the two private inputs. Turnovsky and Fisher (1995, p.753) argue that "(...) our
assumption of linear homogeneity in the two private factors views infrastructure as providing economies
of scale in production. An alternative assumption discussed by Aschauer (1989) is to assume that the
production function is linearly homogeneous in all three factors of production. It turns out that the
choice between these two alternative formulations makes little diﬀe r e n c e ,a sl o n ga so n ea s s u m e sF KL>0
in this alternative speciﬁcation."
13which implies that the marginal costs are also independent of the intermediate good




























Each ﬁrm produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate good and prices are set according
to the Calvo model, i.e., ﬁrms are allowed to optimally adjust their prices each period
with a constant probability equal to 1−ξp. In setting the new price, e p
j
t,t h er e o p t i m i z i n g
ﬁrms take into account the probability that it will not reoptimize in the near future.











where γp is the degree of price indexation.
A ﬁrm resetting its price in period t will seek to maximize the discounted sum of






















Given (34), proﬁt maximization by the producers that reoptimize their prices at

































which shows that prices are set as a function of current and expected real marginal






Given equations (28) and (34) and the Calvo price-setting, the law of motion of the














3.3 Policy and Market Clearing
Monetary policy
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type
rule which includes a reaction to deviations of inﬂation from the target and inertia in










with Φπ > 1, guaranteeing satisfaction of the Taylor principle, which is, in the
absence of non-Ricardian consumers, a necessary and suﬃcient condition to guarantee
the uniqueness of equilibrium in this class of models (Galí et al. (2007), Bilbiie et al.
(2008)).
We model monetary policy as a strict inﬂation targeting, placing a zero coeﬃcient on
the output gap, for two main reasons. First, as we intend to isolate possible “purely ﬁs-
cal” eﬀects of a ﬁscal consolidation, we purposely assume the simplest possible monetary
framework; in fact, including output in the interest rate rule induces lower Keynesian
eﬀects because of the interest rate response to the decrease in output. Second, as we
are calibrating the model to the Euro Area, our policy rule seems in line with the legal
mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB) and is supported by empirical evidence
on the preferences of the ECB (Aguiar and Martins (2005)).
Fiscal policy
The ﬁscal authority purchases ﬁnal goods that are employed in two classes of ex-




t ), and hires labor (N
g
t ).
It ﬁnances its spending with lump-sum taxes (Tt) and distortionary taxes − over con-
sumption (τc
t), labor income (τn
t ) and capital income (τk
t). It issues debt (Bt+1), which
consists of one-period nominal discounted bonds, paying 1 unit at the beginning of next
period.
























where wages (wt) are equal to private sector’s wages, as we assume that (i) working
hours can be moved costlessly across the two sectors, and (ii) the private and public
labor supply are perfect substitutes, as working for private ﬁr m so rf o rt h eg o v e r n m e n t
brings households exactly the same marginal disutility.8
All government spending variables and all tax rates are assumed to evolve exoge-

















































Following Bilbiie and Straub (2004) and Galí et al. (2007), we assume a ﬁscal policy
rule of the form,
b Tt = φb b Bt + φg b Gt (47)
where φb and φg are positive constants representing the elasticities of lump-sum
taxes with respect to government debt and government spending, respectively. Under
8There is evidence indeed of a signiﬁcant positive correlation between private and public sector
wages (Afonso and Gomes (2008), Lamo et al. (2008)).
9In what follows a variable with a hat denotes its log deviation from its steady-state value, which
is denoted by a "−"a b o v eav a r i a b l e .
16this rule, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for non-explosive debt dynamics is given
by,10
β
−1(1 − φb) < 1. (48)
Market clearing
The model is closed with two aggregate constraints. First, labor supply must equate






Second, aggregate production must equal the demand for goods by the private and
public sector,





The capital rental market is in equilibrium when the demand for capital by the in-
termediate goods producers equals the supply by the households. The capital market
equilibrium means that the government debt is held by domestic investors at the market
interest rate Rt.
3.4 Calibration
After its log-linearization around the nonstochastic steady state (the full set of lin-
ear rational expectations equations are presented in appendix) the model has thirteen
equations and thirteen endogenous variables: consumption, interest rate, inﬂation, in-
vestment, real current value of capital stock, rental rate of capital, capital stock, real
wage, labor demand, private labor demand, output, government bonds and lump-sum
taxes. The stochastic behavior of the model is driven by fourteen exogenous shocks: four
associated to technology and preferences (εb, εI, εaand εN ), three "cost-push" shocks











t and b τ
k
t).
To calibrate the model, we assume that each period corresponds to a quarter, and
use, as a rule, the Euro Area estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003).
Table 1 presents the calibration and the source for each parameter. In the text
10For more details see Galí et al. (2007).
17that follows, we focus on the coeﬃcients in which we diverge from Smets and Wouters
(2003), namely the steady-state values, and the parameters associated to ﬁscal policy.
Table 1 - Calibration 
Parameter Value Source  Parameter  Value  Source 
Discount factor - β  0.99  standard  Consumption habit - h  0.7  SW 
Inverse elasticity of substitution - σc  1.0  SW  Inverse elasticity of work effort - σΝ 2.0  SW 
Investment adjustment costs - ϕ  4.0 SW  Depreciation rate - δ  0.025 standard 
Degre of price indexation - γp  0.75 SW  Calvo's parameter on prices - ξp  0.75 SW 
Degre of real wage indexation - γw  0.75  SW  Calvo's parameter on wages - ξw 0.75 SW 
Share of capital input - α 0.3  standard  Wages  markup  -  λw 0.3  BLP/J 
Steady-state I/Y - γi = δγk  0.2 ECB  data  Steady-state G
hp/Y - γg
hp  0.03 F/P 
Steady-state G
lp/Y - γg
lp 0.07  F/P  Steady-state  (wN
g)/Y - γwn
g 0.1  F/P 
Steady-state C/Y - γc  0.6 ECB  data  Steady-state (B/P)/Y - γb  2.4 ECB  data
Degree of interest rate smoothing - ρ  0.8 SW  Taylor rule inflation - φπ  1.5 GSV 
Elasticity of taxes to spending - φg  0.1  CS  Elasticity of taxes to debt - φb 0.1  CS 
Capital income tax rate - τ
k  0.2  CMS/C  Consumption tax rate - τ
c 0.2  CMS 
Labor income tax rate - τ
n  0.2  CMS  Productivity of G
hp - η  0.15 Section  2
Productivity of G





Section 2  Productivity of N








p 0.84  C/A  Steady-state  N
g/N - ϑn
g 0.16  C/A 
AR parameter of fiscal policy shocks  0.9  standard  AR parameter of other shocks  0.85  standard 
Notes:  SW – Smets and Wouters (2003); BLP – Bayoumi et al. (2004); J – Jonsson (2007); F – Finn (1998); 
P – Pappa (2009); GSV – Gali et al. (2007) ; CS – Coenen and Straub (2005); C – Cavallo (2005); 
CMS – Coenen et al. (2007); A – Ardagna (2007); Section 2 – Literature review of section 2 
Smets and Wouters (2003) set the steady-state values of the wage markup (λw)a n d
of the price markup (μ)t o1.5, based on estimates for the United States. We set those
at, respectively, 1.3 and 1.35, following Bayoumi et al. (2004) and Jonsson (2007), who
use estimates for the Euro Area. In what regards the steady-state values of the ratios
of private consumption and private investment relative to GDP, we set them equal
to, respectively, 0.6 and 0.2, which broadly corresponds to their average value in the
Euro Area over the period 1981Q1:2005Q411. Following Cavallo (2005) and Ardagna
(2007), we calibrate the steady-state ratios of private and public employment to total
employment as, respectively, 0.84 and 0.16. Following Finn (1998) and Pappa (2009),
the steady-state ratios of the low productivity government spending, high productivity
government spending and public wage bill to output (γglp, γghp and γwng) are calibrated
as, respectively, 0.07, 0.03 and 0.1. The latter is also in accordance with the statistic of
11European Central Bank’s Area-wide Model database, update 6 (September 2006), which has been
originally published in Fagan et al. (2005).
18the European Commission for the European Union in 2007 (Afonso and Gomes (2008)).
Regarding ﬁscal policy, we calibrate the parameters of the policy rule (φg and φb)
both to 0.1, following Coenen and Straub (2005). The autoregressive parameters of all
ﬁscal policy shocks are set to 0.9. The quarterly value of the ratio of real government
debt relative to GDP is set to 2.4, which is in accordance to the Stability and Growth
Pact reference of a annual debt ratio of 60%. As to distortionary taxation, we follow
the average values for the Euro Area calculated by Coenen et al. (2007), setting the
steady-state values of the consumption tax rate (τc)a n dt h el a b o ri n c o m et a xr a t e
(τn)t o0.2.12 As for capital income tax rate (τk), given the wide range of values in
the literature (going from 0 (Coenen et al. (2007)) to 40% (Cavallo (2005))), we set its
steady-state value to 20%.
The crucial parameters for our paper are those associated to the impact of govern-
ment spending and employment on overall productivity. For those parameters, we base
our calibrations on the empirical evidence reported in section 2. Given the evidence
in that section, a value between 0.15 and 0.2 for the output elasticity of the highly-
productive components of government spending seems warranted but we choose to be
conservative and so calibrate parameter η at 0.15. As regards the low productivity
spending we calibrate parameter γ with two alternative values, 0.05 and 0,w h i c hw e
use subsequently for robustness check. The motivation for the null elasticity is that, at
an aggregate level, the productive eﬀects of these inputs may be oﬀset by the absorp-
tion of resources by the related unproductive government spending, like the regulatory
and bureaucratic processes. Regarding the public employment parameter (ν), following
Pappa (2009), we consider two alternative calibrations, 0.15 and 0.05 (Pappa’s calibra-
tion has a wider range, going from 0 to 0.25). These alternative calibrations are also
important to test the model’s sensitivity to these central parameters.
4 Fiscal Consolidations With Changes in the Bud-
get Composition
In this section we set out to identify changes in the budget composition that achieve a
ﬁscal consolidation with a short term favorable impact on output. Fiscal consolidation
12Coenen et al. (2007) found, for Euro Area, average values for consumption and labor income tax
rates of, respectively, 18.3% and 24%. The labor income tax rate includes social security contributions
by employees.
19is deﬁned as a gradual and highly persistent fall in the debt to GDP ratio to a level
signiﬁcantly below its initial steady state. The analysis evolves in steps. First, we ﬁnd
which ﬁscal shocks, among those in our model, do generate a ﬁscal consolidation; then,
we assess their general equilibrium eﬀects; ﬁnally, we search for critical conditions for
expansionary ﬁscal consolidations.
4.1 Fiscal Consolidations
There is a growing consensus in the literature that the success of a ﬁscal consolida-
tion depends on the "quality" of ﬁscal adjustments (von Hagen et al. (2002), Guichard
et al. (2007)). "Good quality" ﬁscal adjustments are typically deﬁned as those based on
government spending cuts rather than on raising taxes; and, among expenditure, par-
ticularly those based on the reduction of current expenditures (public consumption and
social transfers) and politically sensitive items of the budget, such as public employment
and public sector wages.
Cuts in politically sensitive expenditures have a higher probability of successfully
consolidating public ﬁnances because they signal a stronger commitment to their sus-
tainability. In our model there are no comparable credibility eﬀects, but a structure of
several classes of expenditure that have diﬀerent roles in the production of intermediate
goods and income.
Given the above mentioned facts about "good quality" consolidations, we do not
assess tax based strategies, but only consolidations based on spending cuts.
Since our model’s ﬁscal policy shocks are modelled with high persistence, as AR
processes with a root of 0.9, negative spending shocks may induce a gradual and per-
sistent fall of the public debt ratio, and so impulse response functions may be used to
check their potential for ﬁscal consolidation.
In ﬁgure 1 we show the dynamic path of the deviation of the public debt from its
initial steady state value (b Bt) as a result of a unitary shock to government spending,
both non-productive and weakly-productive. In ﬁgure 2 we show the path of b Bt as a
response to a unitary shock to both highly and weakly-productive public employment.
Both ﬁgures include the results under the baseline monopolistically competitive labor
market and the alternative perfectly competitive market.
The results are in the line with the literature: (i) cuts in non-productive government
spending and weakly-productive public employment generate ﬁscal consolidations; (ii)
cuts in productive public spending generate a rather limited and not sustained response
20of debt;13 (iii) cuts in highly-productive public employment also generate a timid re-
sponse of debt and may even induce a long- term increase in debt.
Figures 1 and 2 highlight an interesting result regarding the labor market: pro-
vided that the consolidation is based on cuts in a class of spending with some non-null
productivity, the more competitive is the labor market, the larger is the consolidation.
The ﬁgures further show that ﬁscal consolidations take between 40 and 60 quarters
to fully develop in the case of the most eﬀective shocks. Hence, in the next subsections
we show impulse response functions for such horizon.
4.2 Government Spending Shocks
In this subsection we discuss the general equilibrium eﬀects of the ﬁscal shocks that
have been identiﬁe di nt h ep r e v i o u ss u b s e c t i o na sa c h i e v i n gaﬁscal consolidation.
Non-productive government spending shock (γ= 0)
Figure 3 shows the results from a non-productive government spending negative
shock. While there is a small increase in private consumption and a marked crowding-
in eﬀect on private investment, they are insuﬃcient to oﬀset the direct negative impact
of the spending cut on output, and so a moderate fall in output occurs.
The decrease in non-productive government spending generates a wealth eﬀect
caused by the decrease in the present value of future taxes, which leads households
to increase consumption and leisure, thus reducing labor supply. Given the environ-
ment of monopolistic competition and sticky prices, there is also a labor demand eﬀect:
in response to the decline of aggregate demand, only a few ﬁrms are able to lower prices,
and the others lower production and labor demand. The combination of reductions in
supply and demand, as well as the real wage stickiness, lead to no visible change in the
real wage.
Moreover, there is an intertemporal substitution eﬀect, as the monetary policy reac-
tion to the decrease in inﬂation causes a fall in the real interest rate, leading households
to anticipate consumption. In addition, private investment increases, not only because
of the fall in the interest rate but also because there is a decrease in the rental price of
capital.
13We did not consider a ﬁscal consolidation entirely based on cuts in the highly-productive govern-
ment spending for two reasons. On the one hand, it seems economically unsustainable, from a long-term
output growth point of view; on the other hand, they would not consolidate the ﬁscal position in the
medium- to long-run.
21As expected, these results are generally in line with those obtained for ﬁscal shocks
in models with standard (non-productive) public expenditure (e.g.,S m e t sa n dW o u t e r s
(2003)). Yet, in those models there is a strong crowding-in eﬀect not only on investment
but also on consumption. These consumption eﬀects may be explained by diﬀerences
in the policy framework that involve both transmission mechanisms (wealth and substi-
tution): (i) our model includes a ﬁscal policy rule that generates a decrease in current
lump-sum taxes in response to a lower government spending, which induces a lower
wealth eﬀect, and thus a lower increase in private consumption; (ii) our interest rate
r u l ea t t a c h e saz e r oc o e ﬃcient to the output gap, which reduces the intertemporal
substitution eﬀect.
In the case of a perfectly competitive labor market, the response of private con-
sumption would be identical, but the crowding-in eﬀect on investment would be slightly
higher and, thus, the overall impact on output would be slightly lower.14 Under per-
fect competition, the fall in labor demand resulting from the spending cut increases
the probability of unemployment and moderates wage claims by the households in the
uniﬁed labor market. The resulting fall in marginal costs and increase in ﬁrms’ proﬁts
stimulates investment. This is a result already documented in the theoretical literature
on short-term eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations (Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and
Perotti (1997), Alesina et al. (2002), Ardagna (2007).).
Weakly-productive government spending shock (γ =0 .05)
The general equilibrium eﬀects of a weakly-productive government spending shock
are quite diﬀerent (ﬁgure 4): although the reaction of private consumption remains
muted, investment is crowded-out and, as a result, there is a stronger negative impact
on output.
The diﬀerences to the case of a shock to non-productive public spending are caused
by the negative impact of the government spending cut on the productivity of private
factors, which generates a negative wealth eﬀect that oﬀsets the standard positive wealth
eﬀect arising from the fall in the present value of taxes. The combination of labor
demand and capital demand reductions is associated to some fall in the real wage and
a marked fall in the real rental price of capital.
In the alternative labor market scenario (perfect competition, ﬁgures not reported),
there would be a smaller negative impact on investment and, hence, a lower contraction
14Results not shown, for the sake of space conservation and given their similarity with ﬁgure 3, but
available on request.
22of output. Again, the explanation lies on the higher decline of the (now ﬂexible) real
wage, which induces a fall in ﬁrms’ marginal costs and, hence, an increase in proﬁts,
generating an upward pressure on investment that partially compensates the dominant
fall in capital demand.
Overall, in this subsection, we show that a ﬁscal consolidation based on cutting
productive public spending leads to a twice as large output contraction, compared
to a consolidation based on non-productive spending. The diﬀerence arrises from a
contraction in private investment, due to the dominance of productivity eﬀects over
the other indirect general equilibrium eﬀects, as well as to the smaller dimension of the
wealth eﬀect coming from a weaker consolidation.
4.3 Switching Government Spending Productivity
It is well known that, in an environment of limited public resources and binding ﬁscal
constraints, ﬁscal policy makers may redirect spending towards more productive activ-
ities. In this subsection we simulate ﬁscal consolidations with a switching from non-
or weakly-productive to highly-productive public spending. Such simulations captures
realistic features of ﬁscal consolidations in the real world, as policy makers try to min-
imize the social costs of consolidations and to strengthen their probability of success
promoting long-term economic growth.
Our aim throughout these simulations is to uncover thresholds for combinations of
shocks that may, in our model, generate expansionary eﬀects driven by private invest-
ment and yet achieve a ﬁscal consolidation.
Firstly we have performed four diﬀerent experiments of switching from low produc-
tivity spending to high productivity spending, in which the decrease in the low produc-
tivity spending equals the increase in the high productivity spending, i.e. b G
hp
t = −b G
lp
t .
In the ﬁrst two simulations we cut non-productive spending, while in the third and
fourth we replace weakly-productive spending by highly-productive spending (for all,
both a monopolistically and a perfectly competitive labor market are analyzed). In
summary: (i) γ =0with monopolistic competition in labor market (ﬁgure 5); (ii)
γ =0within a perfectly competitive labor market (ﬁgure 6); (iii) γ =0 .05 with mo-
nopolistic competition in labor market (ﬁgure 7); and, (iv) γ =0 .05 within a perfectly
competitive labor market (ﬁgure 8).
Overall, replacing less productive with more productive public spending reconciles
a ﬁscal consolidation with positive short-term eﬀects on output that are driven by a
23strong increase in private investment. Note that in these simulations so far, there is no
overall reduction of public expenditures, and the ﬁscal deﬁcit improves simply because
of the increase in taxes generated by higher output.
We have further analyzed whether short-term expansionary eﬀects could arise if the
increase in the highly-productive government spending was smaller than the decrease in
the weakly-productive spending. Such combinations would improve the budget balance
more rapidly and thus enhance the ﬁscal consolidation credibility. In particular, we
searched for the threshold for the percentage of the low productivity spending cut that
needs to be compensated by an high productivity spending increase in order to generate
a consolidation with expansionary eﬀects. Four experiments have been made, and their








Table 2 - Thresholds for spending switching
Switching from:
0.40 0.70
The results show that, with our model and calibration, short-term expansionary
eﬀects appear if the highly-productive spending is increased by about 40% of the reduc-
tion in the non-productive spending and 70% of the reduction in the weakly-productive
spending. Hence, if the government reduces the non-productive (weakly-productive)
spending by 10% of its steady-state level, it should increase the highly-productive spend-
ing by about 4% (7%) of its steady-state level. These values are rather similar in the
two analyzed scenarios (perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive labor
market).15
4.4 Public Employment Shocks
In this subsection, we simulate ﬁscal consolidations based on negative shocks to public
employment (a reduction in the number of public employees and/or in public wages).
Given the results in subsection 4.1, we focus on the case of a consolidation via a re-
duction of the weakly-productive public employment. Diﬀerently from the previous
subsection, we do not change the composition of the ﬁscal budget, as we want to high-
15The thresholds presented allow for visible short-term expansionary eﬀects. Some inferior values
may also allow for medium-term expnsionary eﬀects, but with a negative short-run impact on output.
24light the eﬀect of the labor market structure on the short-term output eﬀects of the
consolidation.
A negative shock to weakly-productive public employment achieves a consolidation
with a short run fall in output, as expected, if the labor market has a monopolistically
competitive structure. The results are, thus, qualitatively similar to those obtained
with a pure cut in weakly-productive government spending (ﬁgure 9 vs ﬁgure 4). The
reduction in public employment generates two contradictory wealth eﬀects: on the one
hand, the decrease in public spending increases wealth by decreasing the present ex-
pected value of the tax burden; on the other hand, the direct negative impact on private
factors productivity induces a negative wealth eﬀect. Since the latter is stronger, there
is a contractionary eﬀect on output, induced by a signiﬁcant decrease of investment.
In contrast, if the labor market was perfectly competitive, a consolidation based
on a persistent cut in weakly-productive public employment would have short-term
expansionary eﬀects, driven by a crowding-in of investment (ﬁgure 10).
This can be explained essentially by two reasons. First, the reduction in public
employment leads to a decline in real wages that is much stronger under perfect com-
petition (more than 3 times, on impact, than under monopolistic competition) and
works via two mechanisms: (i) the fall in private factors productivity generates a de-
crease in labor demand and, hence, in wages; (ii) lower public employment induces a
lower reservation utility for private sector workers and, hence, a lower pressure on wage
bargaining. Lower real wages means lower marginal costs, higher proﬁts and, hence,
higher investment. Second, the ﬁscal consolidation is stronger than it would be under
monopolistic competition (ﬁgure 2), which generates a larger positive eﬀect on wealth,
and thus an upward pressure on private investment.
Overall, the results in this subsection highlight the advantages of combining ﬁscal
policy consolidations based on public employment cuts with structural reforms in the
labor market.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has used a new-Keynesian general equilibrium model, with an extended ﬁscal
policy block, calibrated for the Euro Area, to assess the conditions under which ﬁscal
consolidations with changes in the budget composition yield expansionary short-term
investment and output eﬀects.
25The paper has been motivated by the lack of consensus on the size of the ﬁscal
multiplier and on the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations, as well as by the
growing hypothesis that the success and the short-term eﬀects of a ﬁscal consolidation
depend on the budget composition.
The paper brings together two strands of literature. On the one hand, empirical
and theoretical studies considering a direct association between several items of public
expenditure and total aggregate productivity; in particular, estimating diﬀerent output
elasticities for diﬀerent components of public expenditure. On the other hand, the state
of the art sticky price new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models,
that are currently the preferred framework for policy analysis but have been tailored
for monetary rather than ﬁscal analysis.
Our model incorporates into the standard new-Keynesian DSGE model several
classes of taxes and public expenditure, both government spending and public em-
ployment expenditures, allowing such variables to have a direct relation with total
private factor productivity in the intermediate goods sector. We split public spending
into highly-productive and weakly- or non-productive spending, and also allow public
employment to have a strong and a weak productivity eﬀect. The production elasticity
of each class of public spending and employment have been calibrated according to the
evidence in the literature.
The analysis has been developed in successive steps, each conducted, as a rule, for
models with monopolistic and, alternatively, perfect competition in the labor market.
First, we assessed the ability of cuts in each class of public spending and employment
to generate ﬁscal consolidations — i.e. sizeable and sustained deviations from the debt-
ratio from its starting level.
Second, we studied the general equilibrium eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations based on
the reduction of weakly-productive and non-productive spending, as well as based on
changing the composition of the ﬁscal deﬁcit in detriment of public spending with low
productivity and in favor of spending with high productivity.
Third, we studied the general equilibrium eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations based on
the reduction of weakly-productive public employment.
Our main conclusions may be summarized as follows.
The success of ﬁscal consolidations obtained via public spending reductions or em-
ployment costs reduction decreases with their productivity.
As long as consolidation involves the contraction of expenditures with some produc-
tivity, its success increases with the degree of competition in the labor market.
26Consolidations through pure contractions of weakly-productive or non-productive
public spending, generate short-run contractions of output. However, in the former
investment crowds-out and output falls twice as much as does in the latter. Cuts in
weakly-productive spending generate a negative wealth eﬀect due to the reduction of
overall productivity that surpass the standard wealth eﬀect associated to the fall in
future taxes (which is, by itself, smaller as the consolidation is weaker).
Consolidations with a structural change in the ﬁscal budget in favor of more produc-
tive spending — a cut in weakly- (or non-) productive spending together with a symmet-
ric increase in highly-productive spending — have expansionary eﬀects. The spending
switch generates the standard wealth eﬀect associated to expected future taxes as well
as a direct increase in productivity, which both stimulate investment and output. The
short-term expansionary eﬀects are larger when the labor market features monopolistic
competition, because the increase in labor demand due to the rise in productivity leads
to a smaller rise in the real wage than in a perfectly competitive market, and thus to a
larger net increase in proﬁts and investment. A grid search has allowed the detection of
thresholds for the spending switch: ﬁscal consolidation with short-term expansionary
eﬀects exist as long as highly-productive spending increases by 70 percent of the re-
duction in the weakly-productive spending (or 40 percent of the cut in non-productive
spending).
Consolidations through a reduction in weakly-productive public employment gen-
erate short-term expansionary eﬀects on investment and output, if there is perfect
competition in the labor market. The expansion of investment occurs because in a
perfect competition labor market, the fall in the demand for labor by the government
decreases real wages throughout the market, reducing marginal costs, increasing proﬁts
and consequently private investment. Additionally, the consolidation develops quicker
and the wealth eﬀect further stimulates investment.
The results in this paper provide useful benchmarks for strategies of ﬁscal con-
solidation that reconcile ﬁscal discipline with short-term output expansion. They are
particularly informative about the need to a "ﬂight for quality" in what regards public
spending and the need of combining public employment cuts with labor market reforms.
At a methodological level, the paper establishes a model that may be used in further
analyses of transmission mechanisms for alternative consolidation strategies. We intend
to pursue such analyses in future work.
27Figures
FIGURE 1 - Impact of government spending cut on debt
FIGURE 2 - Impact of public employment reduction on debt
28FIGURE 3 - Non-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
29FIGURE 4 - Weakly-productive government spending
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
30FIGURE 5 - Switching from non-productive to highly-productive spending
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
FIGURE 6 - Switching from non-productive to highly-productive spending
(perfectly competitive labor market)
31FIGURE 7 - Switching from weakly-productive to highly-productive spending
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
FIGURE 8 - Switching from weakly-productive to highly-productive spending
(perfectly competitive labor market)
32FIGURE 9 - Weakly-productive public employment
(monopolistic competition in labor market)
33FIGURE 10 - Weakly-productive public employment
(perfectly competitive labor market)
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In this appendix we present the model’s linear rational expectations equations. In what
follows a variable with a hat denotes its log deviation from steady-state.
Consumption equation











b Rt − Etb πt+1
´
−
(1 − h)τc(1 − ρτc)









Thus, current consumption depends (i) positively on a weighted average of past and
expected future consumption, with the corresponding elasticity depending on the habit
persistence parameter (h); and (ii) negatively on the ex-ante real interest rate, with the
interest rate elasticity of consumption depending on the habit persistence parameter and
on the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σc). Preferences shocks
have also a positive impact on current consumption and, as expected, the consumption
tax shock has a negative impact.
Investment equation
















where ϕ =1 /S00 (·).
Thus, current investment depends positively (i) on past and expected future invest-
ment, with elasticities that depend on the rate of time preference β, and (ii) on the
value of installed capital, with an elasticity that is a function of β and ϕ,ap a r a m e t e r
summarizing the investment adjustment costs. A positive shock to the adjustment cost
function temporarily reduces investment.
40Value of capital stock equation
The equation for the value of capital stock results from the linearization of equation
(15):
b qt = β(1 − δ)Etb qt+1 −
³
b Rt − Etb πt+1
´
















β − δτk + δ − 1
1 − τk . (54)
Thus, the current value of the capital stock depends positively on its expected future
value and on the expected rental rate, and negatively on the ex-ante real interest rate.
As expected, it depends negatively on the capital income tax rate as (δ−βrk) is always
negative.16 In equation (53) we have considered an equity premium shock (η
q
t)t h a t
aﬀects positively the value of installed capital, which is meant to capture changes in
the cost of capital that may be due to stochastic variations in the external ﬁnance
premium, and is assumed to follow an i.i.d.-normal process.
Capital accumulation equation
The capital accumulation equation results from the linearization of equation (13):
b Kt =( 1− δ) b Kt−1 +
I
K
b It−1 ⇔ b Kt =( 1− δ) b Kt−1 + δb It−1. (55)
Inﬂation equation
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41Current inﬂation depends positively on past and expected future inﬂation and on
current real marginal costs, which are a positive function of real wages and the rental
cost of capital. The elasticity with respect to changes in past inﬂation is essentially
dependent on the degree of price indexation (γp) while the elasticity with respect to
changes in marginal costs depends crucially on the degree of price stickiness (ξp). The
productivity process (εa
t) impacts negatively on inﬂation, as do the government spending
processes (b G
lp
t , η b G
hp
t , b N
g
t ) which enhance the productivity of private factors. Following
Smets and Wouters (2003), we have introduced a "cost push" shock (η
p
t)i n t ot h ei n ﬂa-
tion equation (56), which aﬀects positively the price markup, and thus inﬂation. This
shock is assumed to follow an i.i.d.-normal process.
Real wage equation




























b wt − σN b Nt −
σc
1 − h















The real wage is (i) positively related to past and future expected real wage, past
and future expected inﬂation, labor demand, current consumption and tax rates; and
(ii) negatively related to current inﬂation and past consumption. The elasticities of
the real wage with respect to inﬂation are dependent on the degree of indexation of
the non-optimized wages (γw). In turn, the elasticities with respect to labor demand
and consumption are intrinsically related to the degree of wage stickiness (ξw). There
is also a positive eﬀect on the current real wage from a labor supply preference shock
(b ε
N
t ), and a shock to the wage markup (ηw
t ), which is assumed to follow an i.i.d.-normal
process.
Real wage equation under a perfectly competitive labor market
Under perfect competition, the real wage equation is derived from the linearization
42of equation (24):
b wt = σN b Nt +
σc
1 − h











The real wage is (i) positively related to the quantity of labor, current consumption
and tax rates (consumption and labor income); and (ii) negatively related to past
consumption. There is also a positive eﬀect on the current real wage from a labor




The labor demand function results from the linearization of equation (31):
b N
p
t = −b wt + b r
k
t + b Kt, (59)
Labor demand depends negatively on the real wage, with a unit elasticity, and
positively on the real rental price of capital and on the capital stock.
Production function
The production function is obtained from the linearization of equation (29):
b Yt = ε
a
t + α b Kt +( 1− α) b N
p
t + γ b G
lp
t + η b G
hp




Linearization of the simple interest rate rule expressed by equation (39), yields:
b Rt = ρb Rt−1 +( 1− ρ)φπb πt + η
R
t . (61)
The interest rate reacts to current inﬂation but exhibits persistence, with a degree
of smoothing ρ. It is also assumed that there is a monetary policy shock which is a
temporary i.i.d. normal interest rate shock (ηR
t ).
Government budget constraint and ﬁscal policy rule



































































where, γglp = Glp
Y , γghp = Ghp
Y , γt = T
Y , γb =
B
P
Y , γwn = wN
Y , γk = K




As expected, debt depends positively on government spending and on the debt
service (past debt and real interest rate), and negatively on taxes.
The ﬁscal policy rule is,
b Tt = φb b Bt + φg b Gt. (63)
Market clearing conditions
The goods market equilibrium condition results from the linearization of equation
(50):
b Yt = γc b Ct + δγkb It + γglp b G
lp
t + γghp b G
hp
t , (64)
Finally, from the linearization of equation (49), we get:
b Nt = ϑnp b N
p
t + ϑng b N
g
t (65)
where, ϑnp = N
p
N and ϑng = N
g
N , are the steady-state ratios of private and public
employment to total employment.
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